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Truthful social science or: how we learned to stop worrying and love the bomb
Dr. Strangelove: The whole point of a
Doomsday Machine is lost, if you keep it
a secret! Why didn’t you tell the world,
EH?
Ambassador de Sadesky: It was to be
announced at the Party Congress on
Monday. As you know, the Premier
loves surprises.
(‘Dr. Strangelove’, by S. Kubrick, 1964)
Phronetic social science
Phronesis, for those new to the concept, is one of the three intellectual virtues identified
by Aristotle. Opposed to episteme, which concerns universals laws and knowledge, and
techné, which is related to the application of instrumental, technical knowledge,
phronesis is ‘akin to practical wisdom that comes from an intimate familiarity with the
contingencies…of social practice embedded in complex social settings’ (Schram and
2Caterino 2006, p. 8). In other words, phronesis is knowledge emerging from contextual
praxis, which can inform and guide decision under the particular circumstances where it
emerges. It is neither about general truths, nor technical applications; rather, it is
about making a localized set of practices and knowledge matter in terms of practical
reason. In Making social science matter (MSSM), Flyvbjerg (2001) expands the original
Aristotelian concept through insertions from Bourdieu, Dreyfus, Foucault, and Nietzsche.
His aim is to show (as he successfully does) that social science should not emulate
natural science on the basis of epistemic or techné as a foundation for its knowledge
practices. Rather, social science should be concerned with ‘practical activity and practical
knowledge in everyday situations’ (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 134), critically investigating the
norms and structure of power and dominance relations, and thereby contributing to the
framing of society’s judgments and choices. Framed in this way, social science is not
about explicating the rules that govern society as-a-whole, rather is about actively helping
society in reasoning about its diverse, multiple, and context-specific practical
rationalities.
The debate that Flyvbjerg’s (2001) contribution sparked (Laitin 2003; Flyvbjerg
2004; Schram 2004), and the further theoretical-methodological points raised in Making
political science matter (Schram and Caterino 2006), bring us to the book that I’m about
to review, Real social science: applied phronesis. The aim of the book is captured in its
title: to present concrete examples of how phronesis works in social science research. It is
worth noting from the outset that the book is extremely engaging, rich and stimulating. It
is an illuminating collection of essays that provide a wide spectrum of examples of
phronetic social science: from narrative analysis to filming, passing through feminist
3studies and collaborative research, to cite just a few. What unifies these case studies is
not their explicit reference to phronesis – indeed, as the editors of the volume remind us,
‘phronetic social science existed well before this particular articulation of the concept’ (p.
285) – but the fact that they investigate localized practices and contribute (although with
different degrees of engagement) firstly to problematizing and secondly to actively
challenging the rationale(s) underpinning them. Moreover, the book provides a solid
ground to trace the potentialities of the phronetic approach to social science. The book
consists of fourteen chapters distributed among three-hundred pages and is divided into
two parts, the first dealing with theory and methods, while the second presents the case-
studies. I will first critically review each of the chapters and then, on the basis of insights
collected along the way, will turn to a broader reflection on phronesis and social science
research.
Theory and method
Following a concise introduction by the editors, including Sanford Schram’s very clear
introduction to phronetic social science, in chapter three Todd Landman makes a strong
case for ‘the use of systematic methods that address otherwise normatively informed and
value-based questions’ (p. 27). For Landman, but also for Flyvbjerg, strong methods are a
quintessential characteristic of a phronetic approach to social science. Among them,
Landman prefers narrative analysis, which is particularly relevant to phronetic research
since it ‘allows the social scientist to uncover perceptions, experiences and feelings about
power, power relations and institutionalized constraints as they are confronted (or not)
through social and political engagement’ (p. 32). The chapter competently demonstrates
4the usefulness of narrative analysis for phronetic research, although it does not fully
explain why this particular method should be privileged above others. Although the
author never argues that this should be regarded as the phronetic method par-excellence,
the reader may wonder why narrative analysis is the only methodology fully investigated
in the first part of the book (where the most theoretically dense essays are presented). An
explicit comparative discussion on other methodologies that could be proficiently used in
phronetic research – such as participant observation, given its attention to the context of
action – could have been better situated in this part of the book. It is worth noting,
however, that the chapter concludes with a very clear ‘set of steps’ to conduct ‘real social
scientific research’ (p. 43), which is informative also for scholars adopting methodologies
other than narrative analysis.
Chapters 4 and 5 are the strongest and most compelling theoretical contributions
in the book. The former, written by Arthur W. Frank, is a beautifully written account of
‘everyday phronesis’, which understands phronesis not as something to possess, but as an
ethos, i.e. phronesis is ‘what social scientific study requires from researchers’ (p. 48,
emphasis added). Frank explains and clarifies his point through an example taken from
Tolstoy: phronesis is the capacity of Nikolay Rostov (a central character in Tolstoy’s War
and peace) to learn from the peasants he observes and, in light of these interpersonal
experiences, he also learns how to act accordingly. Without entering into too much detail
here, phronesis is understood as a resource, a capacity, and a practice. This point is
further developed in Frank’s account of Bourdieu and Foucault, to whom he turns to find
phronetic research tools. In the first case Frank argues that Bourdieu, in showing the
importance of illusio in understanding the relationship between the habitus of the self and
5the context (field) of action, phronetically (hence practically) teaches us that ’[r]eal social
science…requires the capacity for sustaining the respective illusio of both the academic
and the everyday fields, while remembering the differences between them’ (p. 56). As I
will argue later on, I find this point extremely important, especially if taken along
with Flyvbjerg’s stress on ‘the very raison d'être of phronetic social science’, which is
‘to help society see and reflect’ (Flyvbjerg 2001, p. 158). In the second case, Frank points
out that what Foucault teaches us in terms of everyday phronesis is that we are always
confronted by danger. Frank concludes the chapter by showing how phronesis has a
relational nature, and thus cannot be the property of an individual. Our illusio is therefore
constantly confronted with that of others, in a relational game of power where Foucault’s
alertness to danger becomes possibly the only real phronetic advice to follow: since there
is always danger, the only possible thing to do is to learn practically from our encounters
with it, as Nikolay Rostov does (more on this point below).
The following chapter has been written by two of the most respected authors in
the fields of organization science, Clegg and Pitsis. The chapter reflects Clegg’s
extensive writing on power, as well as the empirical work that the two authors have
collaborated on in researching megaproject alliances. The authors confront the notion of
power in phronetic research deepening the account originally given by Flyvbjerg, which
was mainly based on Foucault. Re-constructing the debate around the dimensional view
of power, from Dahl to Bachrach and Baratz, and from Lukes to Haugaard, the authors
argue in favour of a notion of power which moves beyond the idea of social actors being
passively (or unconsciously) subjected to power. In other words, the actor is not
unknowingly in the hands of power – as Lukes’ three-dimensional view seems to
6suggest – nor simply unable to express his/her true interests. Rather, as Haugaard puts it
(1997), social actors have a practical consciousness (a sort of tacit knowledge that
emerges in everyday practices) that they are sometimes unable to translate into discursive
consciousness knowledge. However, the lack of translation does not imply that they are
unaware of power, since they practically experience it. Underlying this point, Clegg and
Pitsis render quite vividly the added value of phronesis in the study of power: phronesis
is a ‘pragmatic tool’ that forces us – by definition – to look within the contextualized
practices of the actors that we take into consideration, therefore taking into account their
practical consciousness. From this perspective, phronesis is a relevant political tool too,
since it can be used to help those actors in articulating their practical consciousness in the
form of discursive consciousness knowledge. Starting from these premises, which
strengthen Foucault’s relational take on power, the chapter provides a captivating account
of research undertaken by the authors on megaproject alliances. The account is
interesting because it shows that ‘doing phronetic research necessarily entails a power
relation between researchers and researched’ (p. 83). In other words, the researcher is not
exempt from power relations, since (again, like the fictional Nikolay Rostov) he/she
inhabits contexts (the context of research, and the academic one) and enacts his/her own
practical consciousness through negotiations with that of the researched. The bottom line
is that phronetic research should not only study practices, but also translate its practices
(even those that fail) into discursive knowledge.
Applied phronesis
7The second part of the book, named ‘applied phronesis’, presents a series of case-studies.
Before turning to a more general reflection, I will give a brief review of the most
compelling of them.
In ‘Why mass media matter and how to work with them’, Flyvbjerg gives, to
my knowledge, the most readable and insightful account of why social researchers need
to engage with the public sphere and how to do so. Reporting on his own experience with
Danish and international media, Flyvbjerg advocates for the public dissemination of
social research through an ad-hoc engagement with mass media. For him
‘[c]ommunicating research to practice is part and parcel of applied phronesis and not
something external to it’ (p. 95). The chapter is in itself a form of phronesis, since it
provides the reader with insightful and practical advice on how to ‘make social science
matter’ beyond the auto-referential walls of academia. Engaging with mass media is not
the most important part of the phronetic game, since the first rule is always to ‘study
things that matter in ways that matter’ (p. 116), but it is nonetheless part of what social
scientist need to do to have a real impact in public deliberation, policy and practice.
In the following chapter, Shdaimah and Stahl confront one of the possible ways
of doing phronetic social science, namely collaborative research (CR). The authors claim
that CR is ‘the very model of phronetic research’ (p. 122) because it does not only imply
that stakeholders simply participate in the research project but that ‘researchers
participate in the larger societal projects’ (p. 123). In this way the researcher’s ideas and
arguments are unavoidably exposed and contested, so that the question of power (or the
relations of power among researchers, stakeholders and the wider community) is once
again highlighted. In this sense, the authors unfold some of the points raised by Flyvbjerg
8in the preceding chapter. First, that the ‘need for research (and researchers) [is], to large
extent, a result of political forces’ (p. 128), which therefore need to be taken into
consideration in reflecting upon the research process. Second, that the research process
could ‘harm constituents’, and that the constituents themselves are usually very aware of
this. Third, that in doing CR, the non-academic research partner may see the research as
an ‘organizing tool’ for its own purposes (as shown also by Clegg and Pitsis) and that this
triggers a whole set of power-related issues. Shdaimah and Stahl do not, however, limit
themselves to the enumeration of these issues. Rather, they clearly state that phronetic
researchers should not try to prevent conflict but to actively engage with it: conflict is
part of the research process, and as such needs to be practiced, in order to unfold the
‘knowledge-power nexus’ (p. 133) both for the sake of the researches and the
stakeholders.
Chapter 8, by Sandercock and Attili, is arguably one of the most brilliant works
presented in the book. The chapter illustrates the authors’ research project on conflict,
which involved two small First Nations communities in northern British Columbia, where
they used filmmaking as their main research method. Filming, for the authors, is a mode
of enquiry. It is, moreover and quite obviously, also a means to target the wider public
arena in a way tangential – but not necessarily equal – to Flyvbjerg’s use of mass media:
it is a way, as they put it, ‘to start public conversation’ (p. 142). However, the chapter is
not only stimulating for the kind of research that the authors have carried out. Its strength
relies on the fact that it candidly offers an account of what being phronetic implies in
terms of the methodological, political and ethical choices adopted in the research.
Sandercock and Attili have designed and carried out their work through a coherent set of
9objectives which are clearly set out in the chapter. The delineation of objectives and self-
imposed guidelines is of course an almost obligatory part of the research design process.
However, Sandercock and Attili’s objectives are intrinsically of a political nature, since
they aim to unfold the conflict that takes place in the two communities without serving to
‘exacerbate the existing polarization’ (p. 147). The lesson that the two authors offer us is
that they speak freely, and frankly, about the political and ethical consequences of their
political choice. Half of their chapter is almost solely about this, namely because
phronesis is quintessentially about the ‘practical knowledge and practical ethics’
(Flyvbjerg 2001, 56) that one implies in what one does. Disclosing these choices to the
reader, and rendering clearly how one ought to achieve his/her political and research
objectives, should be thus seen as a fundamental step in phronetic research.
Chapter 9, by Griggs and Howarth; 10, by Olsen, Payne and Reiter; 12, by
Simmons; and 13 by Ranu, are four very good methodological examples of how
phronetic social science can be (respectively) a vehicle to problematize technocratic
forms of decision-making; to re-work established scholarly knowledge; to find new ways
to teach social justice and deconstruct dominant ideologies; and to show how neoliberal,
spatial, policy-making is able to divert attention from the causes of localized problems of
poverty and marginality. Among these relevant contributions, Simmons’ chapter is of
particular interest for at least two reasons. First, because it is the only one in the book that
addresses the problem of ‘teaching’ phronesis (aren’t we, after all, also teachers?).
Second, and most importantly, because it offers an original take on phronesis itself, based
on a notion of power derived from Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the oppressed (2007
[1968]). From this account we learn that in order to defeat the ‘hegemonic power
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structures’ of our academic knowledge (and, I would add, paraphrasing Flyvbjerg, of our
academic contexts) social scientists ‘must work with marginalized communities to call
into question academic knowledge itself through the co-generation of new knowledge’ (p.
247). This is a point, as I will argue in the conclusions, which could really make a
positive difference in the future of social science (which was Flyvbjerg’s main concern in
introducing phronesis in the first instance).
Virginia Eubanks’ chapter 11 does the important job of connecting phronesis to
feminist epistemology and sociology of knowledge. The contribution this makes to
phronetic social science is relevant because it enables it to take into consideration
differences of class, race and gender in the production of the contextual practices and
knowledge that phronesis aims to investigate. In particular, Eubanks draws attention to
the specific role of texts and discourses to ‘order and organize practice and understanding
across a variety of sites and settings’ (p. 235) and to the fact that different ‘vectors of
oppression work together’ rather than in self-contained forms (p. 237). These are
elements, in the end, which force phronetic social scientists to trace carefully the
complicatedness of oppression and privilege. Moreover, Eubanks concludes her chapter
with a call that expands those evoked in chapters 7 and 8, namely that theory production
should be seen as a mutual process between the researcher and the ‘researched’, as much
as it is for the production of practical reasoning.
The book ends with a final chapter by Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram, who
summarize how the book contributes to a return of ‘social science to society and its
politics’ (p. 286). Phronesis is, first and foremost, about politics – it is a call for social
scientists to ‘become virtuoso social actors in their chosen field of study and do politics
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with their research’ (p. 287, emphasis in original). The editors explain that the case
studies presented in the book have a common focus, namely the identification of ‘tension
points’ through which contextualized issues of power are recognized and challenged.
These points can be discerned when/where power relations are ‘particularly susceptible to
problematization and thus change’ (p. 288). The phronetic researcher is asked to reveal
them, unfolding their rationale and developments, and not to refrain from the potential
conflicts that naturally arise in dealing with them. A list of ‘important next steps’ to be
carried in order to further strengthen the phronetic approach to social science is also
provided, which includes, but is not limited to, some of the things that I am briefly going
to touch on now.
Truthful social science?
As a way of concluding this review, I want to compose a few words around the
opportunities that phronetic social science offers to date, trying also to challenge some of
its tenets.
First, as recognized by the editors in the concluding chapter, there is the
necessity to identify ‘clarification of similarities and differences between phronetic social
science and other types of research’ (p. 294). The point is important, but there is the risk
that it becomes an indexical exercise that succeeds in procuring a few publications for its
authors, but little more (and I am confident that the editors are aware of this). In other
words, the risk is to reduce phronesis to a tick-box exercise, a labelling practice: ‘This
research conforms to phronetic standards’. How to avoid this? My suggestion is to
consider phronesis not as a form of social science, but as a growing repository of
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practice-based knowledge that can be used by different social-scientific researchers. The
book seems to me perfectly aligned to this understanding of phronetic research. In this
sense, the confrontation between, for instance, ‘action research’ and ‘phronetic social
science’ would not be a matter of what the two have in common and where they differ,
but of what the former could take from the latter and how, in doing so, it could give back
more practical knowledge to the ‘phronetic repository’. The book offers some good
examples of how such a confrontation might work, as in the case of Eubanks where she
provides theoretical and methodological tools taken from feminist studies that both
contribute and challenge the phronetic repository. I am probably flying too high here but
I see the phronetic approach to social science as a transdisciplinary meta-container, an
open-source project, defined by guidelines and values to which its participants adhere,
further implementing them, contaminating their own scientific identities with that of
others through the phronetic encounter. In this sense, ‘phronetic social science’ should
not be seen as another kind of social science, but as an overarching platform from which
to take and to which one can contribute. A possible parallelism is with Wikipedia: an
ongoing repository of knowledge where the singular entries have their own peculiar
specificity, although they all comply with a precise socio-political project (which no-one
could appropriate, privatize, or reduce to a pass-by reference in a paper). This is how I
understand the decade of debate and contribution around ‘phronetic social science’, and
this is why I think that it can make a huge difference to any and all scholars.
The second point is related to the most problematic of Flyvbjerg’s phronetic
questions, which from my perspective is: ‘Is this desirable?’ (Flyvbjerg 2001). The
question is central because it poses an ethical dilemma: is (the development of the
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situation that we have researched) good or bad? This dilemma, along with the focus on
practices and the stress on public engagement, is the most important part of what we are
identifying as ‘phronetic approach to social science’. It asks us to take a position, to stand
up and make our research alive. But how do we do so? Flyvbjerg has always been quite
clear on this point. Since phronesis is about contextual praxis and knowledge, our
understanding of the good and the bad should be contextually based too. As the editors
write in their conclusion: ‘the socially and historically conditioned context, and not
fictive universals, constitutes the most effective bulwark against relativism and nihilism
and is the best basis for action’ (p. 293). Although I agree with this argument, I do think
that its practical consequences are still under-explored by the phronetic debate. Flyvbjerg
and his colleagues suggest that the normative basis for applied phronesis ‘is the attitude
among those who problematize and act, and this attitude is…based…on context-
dependent common world view’ (p. 293), which of course may be (and usually are)
different for each group taken into consideration. To me, this means that the answer to
the question ‘Is this desirable?’ does not come from us, the researcher, but from the
relation between what we produce and the groups’ engagement with it. Sandercock and
Attili’s chapter is the perfect example of what I am talking about. They provided the
groups that they studied with a map (the movie) to explore and to discuss their issues, and
these groups decided, on the basis of their own practical knowledge, if their situation was
or was not desirable. It is, however, not always possible to proceed by the route taken by
Sandercock and Attili, and that’s why further debate is needed around this central
phronetic question. Let me briefly highlight two points in this sense. First, the framing of
the research project may be implicitly affected by underlying assumptions that
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researchers carry with them. In this case responses to ‘Is this desirable?’ are going to be
affected by the way the question has been posed. Second, the complexity of the different
‘worldviews’ at play in a specific field could be so dense as to require research within the
research (the first to establish where we, and every one of the parties involved, sit in
terms of the research topic, and the second to answer the actual research questions). I
experienced the latter case in my own research on homeless people in Turin, Italy, where
the desirability of this or that policy on homelessness could not be determined without
questioning my own perception of homelessness, the established academic views on it,
the social welfare discourses of public policy, and the Catholic take on poverty implied
by the faith-based organizations operating in the city (Lancione 2011; forthcoming). Both
the first and the second point could be confronted by inserting reflexivity as a basic
practice of any phronetic research, as some of the authors of the book have already done.
Auto-ethnography, in this sense, could be a valuable methodology in order to consciously
acknowledge the illusio that Frank writes about (Reed-Danahay 1997).
The third and last point, which is linked to the previous one, is a provocation
aimed at further highlighting the intrinsic political value of phronesis. Phronetic research
is, perhaps, not real social science (a term which I find rather problematic), but
a truthful approach to social science. If we adopt a Foucauldian take on power, being
truthful (or honest, or virtuous) means first and foremost to unfold and vividly render the
relations of power in which we are enmeshed. These include our own illusio, the circuits
of power in which we operate (and that we reproduce), the relations that we have with
research partners, and the ones with the broader public sphere. As Flyvbjerg, his
colleagues, and all the authors of the book show, a phronetic take on social science is
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well equipped for this task. However, in order to be truthful, phronetic social scientists
also need to clearly assess where they are coming from, where they want to go, and how
they aim to get there. In the end, if we do not legitimize our work either in the form of
universal laws (episteme) or on the basis of technical knowledge (techné), then our
research practices form the only possible ground from which to forge our practical values
and scrutinize the value of what we do (as shown, for instance, by Clegg and Pitsis).
Thinking of phronesis as a truthful approach to social science requires new phronetic
questions to be answered along with the old ones (Table 1).
Table 1 about here
Phronetically-driven social scientists need to openly discuss their methods and
(as far as possible) be able to disclose deep-seated assumptions, mindful of the limitations
and possible consequences of their knowledge-production (Simmons), clear in their
political role (Sandercock and Attili), ready to engage in conflict (Shdaimah and Stahl),
and actively involved in society (Flyvbjerg). These are all elements that do not need to be
kept secret, as in the case of Dr. Strangelove’s ‘Doomsday machine’ quoted at the start of
this essay. Rather, they need to be brought to the forefront of what we produce, because
they allow us to be truthful to our phronetic claims, where the ‘truth’ is seen as ‘the
generic potency of a transformation of a domain of knowledge’ (Badiou 2009, p. 43). In
other words, it is through these reflexive elements that we will be able to ‘invent a better
social science, one that connects research to practical reasoning and social action’
(Eubanks, this volume, p. 228). Phronesis is co-constituted by the researchers’ efforts to
question their own knowledge (and their knowledge production), and by the practice-
16
based and discursive-based knowledge emerging from the studied context. If carefully
prepared, this is the kind of bomb that many of us would rather love to detonate.
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Where are we going with
this specific problematic?
Can we identify dubious
practices within policy and
social action?
Am I conscious of the
illusio of both the academic
and the everyday research
field?
Who gain and who loses,
and by which mechanisms
of power?
How can these practices be
problematized?
What are my underlying
pre-assumption on the
specific topic of my
research?
Is this desirable? How can we help to
develop better practices?
How are my pre-
assumptions going to affect
the design of my research?
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What should be done? - What are the consequences
of the knowledge that I am
going to produce?
- - What is the political
rationale of my work?
Source: (1) From Flyvbjerg, 2001; (2) Adapted from Flyvbjerg, Landman and Schram,
2012.
